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Gombrowicz the Artist

I’m reading intermittently ’s Diary, which was part of a wedding gift that consisted of several Polish classics. I’ve been wading through it for about two months now. I read a day here, a day there, an entry or two in a single day, then nothing for a couple of weeks.

It’s hard going because there’s only so much self-congratulatory discussion on Art (and that capital “A” is critical) that I can handle in one sitting. Gombrowicz was a self-exiled Polish writer who seemed constantly to be growling and grumbling against “timid Polish Art” and such. He’s an Artist with the Capital A because he regards Art (again, that “A” must be there) as something as critical as Air (an equally important “A”), and thinks Disastrous Art will lead to the Downfall of Civilization as surely as bad monetary policy. He does admit once that Art (or even lowly art) is a luxury, but only in a fever of humility that quickly passes.

It reminds me of what Lawrence Ferlinghetti writes in #15 from A Coney Island of the Mind of the adventures, difficulties, and responsibilities of a poet. It’s the ever-popular poem about poetry, in other words. It seems to be a bit of self-flattery, the knight looking at himself in a mirror, admiring his own armor and coming heroism. And taking himself entirely too seriously, the

super realist
who must perforce perceive
taut
truth
before the taking of each stance or step

As if the right words will save the world, and the wrong ones, destroy. The whole poem, for those interested (without F’s beat-poet line indentions):

the
poet like acrobat
climbs on rime
to a high wire of his own making
and balancing on eyebeams
above a

of his audience
sea of faces
paces his way
to the other side of day
performing entrechats
and slight-of-foot

above the heads
tricks
and other high theatrics
all without mistaking
any thing
for what might not be.
For he’s

whenever he performs
the super realist
who must perforce perceive
taut truth

Constantly risking absurdity
start her death-defying leap
And he
a little charliechaplin man
who may or may not catch
her fair

with gravity to in
eternal form
spreadeagled in the empty air
of existence

before the taking of each stance or step
and death
his supposed advance
toward that still higher perch
where Beauty stands and waits

I don’t know why it annoys me so much for an Artist to think of himself so seriously. He spends quite a bit talking about how no one understands him, how no one can comprehend what he’s been doing in his various novels that might appear to be unreadable, but in fact are only difficult because we’re not accustomed to such radically different Art.

“What I’m trying to do . . .”

Tom Wolfe commented on this thirty years ago:

Then and there I experienced a flash known as the Aha! Phenomenon, and the buried life of contemporary art was revealed for me for the first time. All these years I, like so many others, had stood in front of a thousand, two thousand, God-knows-how-many-thousand Pollacks, de Koonings, Newmans, Nolands, Rothkos, Rauschenbergs, Judds, Johnses, Olitskis, Louises, Stills, Franz Klines, Frankenthalers, Kellys, and Frank Stellas, now squinting, now popping the eye sockets open, now drawing back, now moving closer — waiting, waiting, forever waiting for … it … for it to come into focus, namely, the visual reward (for so much effort) which must be there, which everyone (tout le monde) knew to be there — waiting for something to radiate directly from the paintings on these invariably pure white walls, in this room, in this moment, into my own optic chiasma. All these years, in short, I had assumed that in art, if nowhere else, seeing is believing. Well — how very shortsighted! Now, at last, on April 28, 1974, I could see. I had gotten it backward all along. Not “seeing is believing,” you ninny, but “believing is seeing,” for Modern Art has become completely literary: the paintings and other words exist only to illustrate the text (quoted in Steven Pinker’s The Blank Slate).

We have to have it explained to us. And what exactly are they explaining? Back to Pinker:

The political messages of most postmodernist pieces are utterly banal, like “racism is bad.” But they are stated so obliquely that viewers are made to feel morally superior for being able to figure them out.

This is true not only by the artists, but by the critics as well. Try reading a college textbook on film criticism. You’ll find yourself wondering how someone could write something so contorted, so warped — how someone could use so many words to say so comparatively little.

And so where does it leave us in this blog-invested world, where now everyone is an artist and everyone is trying to say something?

He writes with a grin.

Photo by 50 Watts

Chester, Oscar, and the Problem of Evil

Last night I began reading Oskar i Pani Róza, which is originally Oscar et la dame rose (Amazon.com) and in English would be Oscar and Ms. Rose. It’s about a ten-year-old dying of cancer and a volunteer he makes friends with, named Ms. Rose. When Ms. Rose suggests that Oskar write to God, he replies that he doesn’t believe in God. She suggests that perhaps he should write anyway:

“Maybe you would feel less lonely?”
“Less lonely with someone who doesn’t exist?”
“Why not check if he exists?”
She bent down close to me and said, “Every time you believe in him, he’ll exist a little more” (15, my translation).

Believing in something makes it more real? Is that what she’s saying? Of course, it is, and of course, it’s true. Does that mean that God exists only in our heads, that we create him by believing in him? Not quite, I think, but strangely enough, taking a leap of faith and just believing seems to make it more believable.

Czeslaw Milosz wrote in The Captive Mind (Amazon.com),

The Catholic Church wisely recognized that faith is more a matter of collective suggestion than of individual conviction. Collective religious ceremonies induce a state of belief. Folding one’s hands in prayer, kneeling, singing hymns precede faith, for faith is a psycho-physical and not simply a psychological phenomenon.

Doing leads to believing. Believing is, in a sense, encapsulated in this “doing,” and so paradoxically, as Ms. Rose seems to be saying, believing leads to believing.

This is also the question in Life of Pi, though much more directly than in Oskar. I remember the quote, something like “If you stumble at believability, what is there left to live for?” Or something like that.

I was making a sandwich or something last night – perhaps pouring a brandy, I can’t remember – and I thought, “It would indeed be nice to believe in something out there, something bigger than us that we can count on to help us when we need it.”

The trouble with that is simply that I don’t see help where help is most needed – in the suffering of a child: the painful and incomprehensible suffering that child might have to endure before dying, and that’s the “problem of evil” as I frame it. Not just any evil – incomprehensible evil.

All evil can be understood on some level by adults.

Incomprehensible evil is that which attacks children, like children in Rwanda who were hacked to death with a machete because of their ethnicity when the notion of “ethnicity” is so foreign to them that it would be difficult to explain it to them.

Reading Strobel

I began reading The Case for Christ by Lee Strobel this week. My parents brought it to me in addition to the two books I’d requested. I’d read some reviews of it on Amazon, and the common complaint against it is that it doesn’t present the other side of the issue. There is a short chapter on the issues raised by the Jesus Seminar, but that’s about it other than occasional objections raised here and there by skeptics. I’ve no problem with this in a way, for the book is The Case for Christ and not Christ on Trial. In other words, even in the title it makes it clear that it’s presenting one side of the story.

One thing I do have a problem with is how much of the argument is based on something being “reasonable” or the alternative being “unlikely.” For example, “Given that Jesus’ followers looked upon him as being even greater than a prophet, it seems very reasonable that they would have done the same thing [(i.e., record his words accurately)]” (41, emphasis mine).

It’s often just conjecture. For example, concerning the casting of the demons into the swine, Strobel points out that Mark and Luke say it happened in Gerasa, with Matthew putting it in Gadara. After the scholar (Blomberg) suggests that one was a town and the other a province, Strobel adds, “Gerasa, the town, wasn’t anywhere near the Sea of Galilee.” Blomberg responds:

There have been ruins of a town that have been excavated at exactly the right point on the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. The English form of the town’s name often gets pronounced ‘Khersa,’ but as a Hebrew word translated or transliterated into Greek, it could have come out sounding something very much like ‘Gerasa.’ So it may very well have been in Khersa — whose spelling in Greek was rendered as Gerasa — in the province of Gadara (46, 47).

Goodness — proper understanding of the Bible requires knowing how people could have transliterated or misspelled words! Isn’t the Bible of divine origin? How could this happen?

This issue of divine origin comes up again when discussing the consistency between the gospel accounts. Blomberg says,

My own conviction is, once you allow for the elements I’ve talked about earlier — of paraphrase, of abridgement, of explanatory additions, of omission — the gospels are extremely consistent with each other by ancient standards, which are the only standards by which It’s fair to judge them (45).

The only standards? How about the standard of them coming from a supposedly omnipotent, omniscient source? Of course, apologists like to conjecture that if there was perfect consistency between the gospels, that would be suspect in itself. Perhaps, but there is such a level of inconsistency on basic issues (who saw the resurrected Jesus first, for example).

In some ways, the book is strangely persuasive. I guess it comes from this strange, nonsensical desire to believe again. A childish desire, I suppose — and Christians wouldn’t deny that. “Unless you become like a child” and all that.

Books and School

Last night I finally finished Bleak House, all eight hundred and four pages of it. Certainly a worth way to spend my time. It was quite a great read. The first two hundred of the last three hundred pages or so really move along. After five hundred pages of scene-setting, there are two hundred pages in which so much happens.

There are really some memorable characters, chief among them being Grandfather Smallweed with all his declarations of his senile wife being “a brimstone beast” or warnings to George not to be a “a brimstone magpie” (my favorite). And then there’s Harold Skimpole, a man I would give anything to strangle. Never in a book have I encountered such an ineffably annoying, selfish man. I also really enjoyed Mr. Bucket — a great and unexpected change in opinion. When he’s after Jo, one really hates him. But he turns out to be simply a man with a strong sense of duty, doing what he has to do (or what he feels he has to do) to the utmost of his ability. I came to respect him in the end, which I assume was Dickens’ plan.

There’s something about a Dickens novel, no matter how much I like his corpus as a whole (though I’ve only read four or five of his books as of now), that annoys me. They are, in many ways, predictable. You know that no matter how many characters he introduces and how unrelated they seem to be, they’ll all end up in a tight web by the end of the book, and most of them will turn out to be long lost cousins or brothers to boot. And yet you can’t say that all his novels have unqualified happy endings. In Bleak House Richard dies, as does Lady Dedlock — two characters indispensable to a truly happy ending.

And of course, there’s all the names: Dedlock, Skimpole, Smallweed, etc. Almost every name he chooses is suggestive of the person in some way: remove the “k” and “o” from “Skimpole” and you get “simple,” which is precisely how Skimpole presented himself, though he was far from it. Grandfather Smallweed was a minor (read: small) character but he was something of a pain in the ass most of the book (read: weed). In the end, even when he was being beneficial, he was still self-serving.

Yesterday I had class 4a group b. I think. At any rate, it was the group with Basia in it. Once again, no problems at all out of her. In fact, while I wouldn’t go so far as to say she’s a “dream” student, she is usually quite attentive and hard working, and she’s more than willing to speak English in class. She chatters away during activities without reservation. I don’t know what happened that day, but I certainly hope it doesn’t happen again.

Yet it confirms (or it seems to confirm) my method of handling it — give the student space and the benefit of the doubt and let everything work itself out. I did that with Marcin (4a) to some degree. I talked to him, making it clear that I wasn’t going to take shit from him and that how I treated him depended solely on how he treated me. He’s still something of a pain in the ass, but he’s not as bad as he was on those particular days.

Today marks the close of yet another month here. This would make about my thirty-seventh month in Poland. And almost the end of another year.

Time is only accelerating. I haven’t really written about time in so long; haven’t plopped down to moan about how it’s been “x years since thus and such happened and I can’t believe it’s been that long” in quite a while. I guess I could scour my journal and determine how many years it’s been since I was last obsessed with how many years it’s been . . . but I won’t. I’m not where I thought I would be when I was obsessed with time, though. Enough said.